Book

Meddling in the Ballot Box: the Causes and Effects of Partisan Electoral Interventions. Oxford University Press September 2020. Can be purchased at the  Amazon Barnes and Noble or Oxford University Press websites among others. See description of book (and links to reviews etc.) here. 

Winner of the Robert Jervis & Paul Schroeder Best Book Award for 2021 by the American Political Science Association (International History and Politics section).

Refereed Journal Articles:

“Introducing PEIG 2.0: Sixty-nine years of partisan electoral interventions 1946–2014.” Conflict Management and Peace Science, early view

Abstract: In this article we introduce an updated version of the Partisan Electoral Intervention by Great-powers (PEIG) dataset, which collects data on situations where a foreign power tries to determine the election results in another country. This version expands the temporal coverage of PEIG into much of the Post-Cold War era and checks for possible unconfirmed or undetected cases in the period covered by PEIG 1.0, leading to an expanded PEIG 2.0 dataset with a 25.5% increase in temporal coverage and a 37.4% increase in the overall number of electoral intervention cases. After describing the PEIG dataset update process, we describe the patterns of electoral interventions in the Post-Cold War era in comparison with the Cold War era. We then examine the possibility of shifts in their effects in the Post-Cold War era by replicating one key result using the previous version of PEIG, finding no such effect.

“The Diplomacy of Whataboutism and US Foreign Policy Attitudes” 2024 International Organization. 78(1):103-133. (w/Wilfred Chow)  

See posts on paper at  Duck of Minerva and Foreign Affairs

Abstract: Does whataboutism work in global affairs? When states face international criticism, they often respond with whataboutism: accusing their critics of similar faults. Despite its prevalence in policy discussions, whataboutism remains an understudied influence strategy. This study investigates how states use whataboutism to shape American public opinion across various international issues. We find, using survey experiments, that whataboutism mitigates the negative impacts of criticism by reducing public approval of US positions and backing for punitive actions. Whataboutist critiques referencing similar, recent misdeeds have more power to shape opinions. However, the identity of the whataboutist state does not significantly affect effectiveness. US counter-messaging often fails to diminish the effects of whataboutism. These results show that whataboutism can be a potent rhetorical tool in international relations and that it warrants greater attention from international relations scholars.

“Is sunlight the best counterintelligence technique? The effectiveness of covert operation exposure in blunting the Russian intervention in the 2020 U.S. election” 2023, Intelligence and National Security, 38(5): 816-834

Abstract: In runup to 2020 U.S. elections U.S. intelligence agencies tried to prevent Russian covert operations from affecting the results. Various methods were used including the exposure of detected covert Russian activities. The question of the actual effects of this counterintelligence operation however remains open. This study examines the effects of the exposure strategy on target public using a novel method. I find strong evidence that U.S. intelligence agencies efforts to expose the Russian hand succeeded in blunting the effects of the targeted covert activities. This indicates that the exposure counterintelligence strategy is a potent tool for defanging covert foreign election interference/partisan electoral interventions.

“The Meddling American Voter? How Norms, Interests, and Great Power Rivalries Affect U.S. Public Support for Partisan Electoral Interventions Abroad” 2022, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 67(5): 828-857 (w/Paul Musgrave)

Abstract: Foreign electoral interventions have attracted greater attention since the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections. Even though the United States has a long history of intervening in other countries’ elections, evidence about what drives public support for U.S. foreign electoral intervention is scarce. This paper uses a new set of surveys and experiments to test hypotheses about what drives the American public’s views of U.S. electoral interventions abroad. We find that there is no taboo against such U.S. interference in the American public. However, public support for U.S. election interference is not automatic. Respondents do not support interventions solely to advance U.S. interests or to protect democracy, although they prove more supportive of interventions on behalf of democratic parties that also favor U.S. interests or to protect longstanding democracies. Finally, support for an intervention rises when it is framed as responding to the actions of a great-power rival such as Russia.

“The Art of Uncommitment: the costs of peacetime withdrawals from alliance commitments” 2022, European Journal of International Relations 28(3): 589-615 (w/Tetsuro Kobayashi)

Abstract: Are there significant domestic political costs for leaders who disengage from long-standing alliances, costs that discourage such disengagement? Leaders of major powers occasionally look for ways to disengage in non-crisis situations from some long-term commitments to other countries following the legal procedures laid out in the alliance treaty or commitment. However, leaders interested in disengagement from alliances sometimes fear that they will pay domestic disengagement costs, for example, a decline in domestic public support, if they try to withdraw from alliances in that manner in practice. To examine if such fears are justified, we conducted two survey experiments among representative samples of the US public investigating the effects of a presidential decision to end an alliance commitment through the legally prescribed means. We find that disengagement costs exist in general and that some characteristics of the country in question can increase their size and make them more long-lasting. For example, withdrawal from alliances with countries perceived as similar on some key criteria to the United States and as loyal allies, or widespread opposition by experts to this withdrawal, will all increase the size of the disengagement costs and make them more long-lasting. Leaving an existing alliance in peacetime will frequently be a politically losing proposition for American leaders in many plausible situations—one possible reason for the endurance of some US alliances.

“Will You Still Love Me Tomorrow? Partisan Electoral Interventions, Foreign Policy Compliance, and Voting in the U.N.” , 2021, International Interactions 47(3): 449-476 

Abstract: What are the effects of partisan electoral interventions on the target’s subsequent cooperation with the intervener? Attempts by the great powers to affect the election results in other countries have been quite common with electoral interventions occurring in one of every nine elections between 1946 and 2000 as well as in the 2016 US presidential election. One important reason for such interventions has been the interveners desire to change or maintain the target’s foreign policies in a manner favorable to its interests. Nevertheless, there has been little research on whether electoral interventions usually have such effects in practice. This study begins to investigate this question utilizing a common measure of foreign policy preferences and a new dataset of electoral interventions. I find that while successful American electoral interventions do temporarily increase the target’s voting similarity with the US while the assisted leader is in power, and overt American interventions are more effective in this regard. I also find preliminary evidence that Russian/Soviet electoral interventions have no significant effects. These results indicate that such meddling can be for some great powers an effective tool for gaining increased foreign policy compliance out of targets with relatively competitive elections.

“Voting for Trouble? Partisan Electoral Interventions and Terrorism” ,2020, Terrorism and Political Violence 32 (3), 489-505

Abstract: What are the effects of partisan electoral interventions on terrorism in the intervened countries? Attempts by the great powers to affect the election results in other countries have been quite common in the postwar world with electoral interventions occurring in nearly one of every nine competitive elections between 1946 and 2000 as well as in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. However little research has been done on the possible effects such interventions can have on the target countries chances to suffer from domestic terrorism. In this paper I analyze the effects of electoral interventions on terrorism utilizing measures of domestic terrorism and of terrorist group emergence between 1970 and 2000 and 1968 and 2000 respectively. I find that while not all electoral interventions have terrorism inducing effects, overt interventions of this kind significantly increase the amount of domestic terrorism in the target as well as the probability of new domestic terrorist groups emerging.

“Things You Can See From There You Can’t See From Here: Blind Spots in the American Perspective in IR and their Effects”  Journal of Global Security Studies, 2019, 4(3): 345-357  (w/ Robert Trager)

Abstract: How do the limitations of the American perspective in international relations (IR) affect the accuracy of theorizing? We show that assumptions about the relationship between domestic and international politics that underlie significant segments of American IR scholarship are unwarranted. Publics around the world do not respond to United Nations’ and other intergovernmental organizations’ criticism of their governments in the same way that Americans do. Publics are not universally poorly informed of their country’s foreign policies, and they are not equally skeptical of the value of using force for resolving disputes with other states. We demonstrate the limitations of US-based scholarship using new and unique survey data from the United States and other countries. We then address how these US-centric assumptions skew certain IR literatures and limit important research agendas pursued by American scholars.

“A Vote for Freedom? The Effects of  Partisan Electoral Interventions on Regime Type”  Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2019,  63 (4): 839-868

Abstract: What are the effects of partisan electoral interventions on the subsequent character of the regime in the targeted country? Partisan electoral interventions have been frequently used by the great powers ever since the rise of meaningful competitive elections around the world. Such interventions have been found to have significant effects on the results of the intervened elections determining in many cases the identity of the winner. Nevertheless, there has been little research on the effects of partisan electoral interventions on the target’s subsequent level of democracy. This study investigates this question, testing three hypotheses derived from relevant political science literatures. I find suggestive evidence that covert electoral interventions have a significant negative effect on the target’s democracy increasing its susceptibility to a democratic breakdown. I also find preliminary evidence that the identity of the intervener has a mediating effect on the negative effects of covert interventions.

“Partisan electoral interventions by the great powers: Introducing the PEIG Dataset”  Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2019, 36 (1): 88-106

As of mid-May 2017, Altmetric ranks paper  in the top 5% of all research outputs ever tracked.

Abstract: Recent studies indicate that partisan electoral interventions, a situation where a foreign power tries to determine the election results in another country, can have significant effects on the election results in the targeted country as well as other important influences. Nevertheless, research on this topic has been hindered by a lack of systematic data of electoral interventions. In this article, I introduce the Partisan Electoral Intervention by Great Powers dataset (PEIG), which provides data on all such interventions by the US and the USSR/Russia between 1946 and 2000. After describing the dataset construction process, I note some interesting patterns in the data, a few of which stand in contrast to claims made about electoral interventions in the public sphere. I then describe some applications of PEIG for research on electoral interventions in particular and for peace research in general.

“When the Great Power Gets A Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results”   International Studies Quarterly, 2016,60(2):189-202

See the (invited) brief description at the Oxford University Press blog here

As of August 2017, Altmetric ranks paper  in the top 5% of all research outputs ever tracked and  #36 overall of 8.3 million research outputs tracked

Abstract: What are the electoral consequences of attempts by great powers to intervene in a partisan manner in another country’s elections? Great powers frequently deploy partisan electoral interventions as a major foreign policy tool. For example, the U.S. and the USSR/Russia have intervened in one of every nine competitive national level executive elections between 1946 and 2000. However, scant scholarly research has been conducted about their effects on the election results in the target. I argue that such interventions usually significantly increase the electoral chances of the aided candidate and that overt interventions are more effective than covert interventions. I then test these hypotheses utilizing a new, original dataset of all U.S. and USSR/Russian partisan electoral interventions between 1946 and 2000. I find strong support for both arguments.

“Why Great Powers Expand in Their Own Neighborhood: Explaining the Territorial Expansion of the US 1819-1848” (with Benjamin Miller as second author)  International Interactions, 2011, 37(3): 229-262.

Abstract: This article attempts to identify the causes of intraregional great power expansion. Using the state-to-nation balance theory we argue that, in many cases, such great power expansion can be explained as being the result of the incongruence within a given region between the nationalist aspirations and identities of the various peoples inhabiting it and the region’s division into territorial states. The existence of the external type of such incongruence within a great power (that is, a pan-nationalist ideology) turns it into a revisionist state eager to expand, using all means available, in order to “resolve” this incongruence. In addition, this incongruence also creates various nationalistic trans-border groups (like terrorists, private military expeditions/filibusters, settlers, etc.).Often these groups try, through various independent efforts (usually in nearby weak states), to achieve these revisionist goals as well, thus complementing and aiding the revisionist great power’s own efforts. After demonstrating the weaknesses in other existing explanations, this argument is illustrated in the case of the territorial expansion by the United States in the Southwest at the expense of Mexico in the second quarter of the nineteenth century

“Why Following the Rules Matters: The Customs of War and the Case of the Texas War of Independence” Journal of Military Ethics, 2008, 7:2: 116 — 135.

Abstract: It is commonly assumed that the pre-codified, customary law of war had little true influence on the decisions or behavior of combatants in the western world. Evaluating this assumption concerning the custom (or norm) of the giving of quarter to enemy combatants in the Texas War of Independence of 1835–1836, this paper finds a strong and widely accepted norm on this subject already by the early 19th century, which exerted significant influence on the behavior in and the results and consequences of the war. The following of this custom of war by the Texian Army, on the one hand, and its intentional and preplanned breaking by the Mexican army headed by Santa Anna for the supposed military and psychological benefits that would accrue from it, on the other, such as in the cases of the Alamo and Goliad, led to severe internal and external consequences for the Mexican side in the short and long term that greatly contributed to their failure to achieve their objectives and to the Texian success in achieving theirs. These consequences indicate the importance of the norms of warfare, even in the pre-codification era, and the major potential costs involved in their breaking or disregard by decision maker

 Chapters in Edited Volumes and Encyclopedia entries (all peer reviewed):

“Should We Worry about Partisan Electoral Interventions? The Nature, History, and Known Effects of Foreign Interference in Elections” in Duncan Hollis and Jens Ohlin (Editors).  Defending Democracies: Combatting Foreign Election Interference in a Digital Age. (New York: Oxford University Press- Ethics, National Security and the Rule of Law series, 2021), Chapter 1

“Violent Regime Change: Causes and Consequences” entry at the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics 2020  (w/ Carmela Lutmar) 

Abstract: The practice of foreign imposed regime change (FIRCs) is old, multicausal, and multifaceted. FIRCs have two main characteristics: they include some form of violent use of force to execute them (either covert or overt in nature), and their consequence is a change in the leadership of the polity in which they take place. FIRCs are frequently claimed to have major effects on their targets, such as inducing shifts towards the regime type preferred by the intervener, inducing intra-state violence, increasing cooperation with the target, and improving the economic welfare of the intervener. A review of the literature on the causes and effects of such interventions as well as the main existing datasets of FIRCs shows that significant progress has been made in our understanding of these phenomena with research on some aspects of FIRCs, such as their utility as a tool of inducing democratization, reaching a near scholarly consensus in this regard. Scholars studying this topic can adjust their current approaches (such as agreement upon a list of FIRCs, and the avoidance of conceptual over-stretching) in order to enable continued progress.

“The Prerequisites Matter: North America’s Transition to Regional Peace” in Carmela Lutmar and Benjamin Miller (editors) Regional Peacemaking and Conflict Management: A comparative approach (2015, Routledge Press)

Abstract: This chapter first explains what led the region of North America, an extremely war prone area during the 19th century (and beforehand), to transition to its current peaceful condition in the late 19th & early 20th century. It then attempts to provide some insights from this North American experience as to how peace can be brought to the present day Middle East.

In Submission/Under Review:

The Diplomacy of Whataboutism (With Wilfred Chow) 

A Protest Vote? Partisan Electoral Interventions and Non-Violent Protests (with John Chin) 

 Muddying the Waters? (With Wilfred Chow)

 By Any Means Necessary? American Public Opinion and Preferences Over Types of U.S. Foreign Electoral Interventions (With Paul Musgrave)

Collateral Benefits? The Diplomacy of Whataboutism Among Third-Party States (with Wilfred Chow and Atsushi Tago)

To What End? Policy Objectives and U.S. Public Support for Election Interference (with Paul Musgrave)

A GOTV poster of the Christian Democratic party  in the 1948 Italian Election (created w/U.S. assistance) “VOTE! or he’ll be your master”

A campaign poster covertly supplied by Russia in the 2004 Ukraine presidential election to the Victor Yanukovych campaign (captured by the Orange parties): Pres. Bush shown as supposedly saying “We are for ‘Our Ukraine’!” [Yushchenko’s party]”